MiniSky: Thoughts About Superficial

Barry Rubin, GLORIA

“We must once again restore the Israeli army’s deterrence, because there is no other way,†explains Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Quite right. The place to start is Syria.

Israel’s strategic policy toward Syria should be based on two simple, basic principles:

1. 1. Israel should make the Syrians believe it wants to see the current regime there overthrown even if it has no intention of making this happen or even really wants that outcome.

   2. Israel should make clear that if there is a future Hizballah attack leading to a war like last summer’s that Syria, not Lebanon, will be the main target of retaliation.

Let’s review the issues and then discuss why this is the best policy. It is true that Israel does not seek the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist dictatorship dominated by the Alawite minority. The reason is that the likely replacement would be an Islamist regime from the Sunni Arab majority. An alternative could be simply another Baathist regime under a different leader but the risks of regime change are certainly real.

Strategy, however, is not just stating what you ultimately want but also what you wish the other side to think you want. In Syria and throughout the Arab world, the idea is clearly held that Israel is not willing to strike too hard as to bring down the Assad regime. In turn, this emboldens that regime to strike hard at Israel, knowing it has little or nothing to fear. That security should be taken away from the Damascus regime.

Clearly, Israel does not want war with Syria. Yet the whole concept of deterrence is to make clear to the Syrians that Israel is not afraid of war and that Syrian support for terrorism against Israel will have real and costly consequences. Without this fear, there is no deterrence. And without deterrence war–either directly with Syria or with Syria’s clients in Lebanon–is far more likely.

The weakness of Syria should also be a factor in Israeli thinking. Despite the possibility of renewed Russian aircraft sales, Syria’s military is badly outdated. A lot of the regime’s threats and use of terrorism is a bluff, formulated precisely to distract from that fact. The Syrian regime has no great power ally and cannot depend on a single Arab government.

Of course, the one international asset Syria enjoys is its alliance with Iran. Yet especially in the period before Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Israel can and must press Syria hard–verbally and even covertly at regular intervals; materially if events require it.

This leads us to the second point. It could not be more obvious that the current Lebanese government is not really an enemy of Israel. While it might be incapable of making peace, it would prefer a quiet border and no conflict. The main enemy of the Lebanese government is not Israel but rather Iran and Syria. Whether or not officials in Beirut say this openly, this is certainly what they think. The same goes for Hizballah, which is the main threat to take over the government.

Given the fact that the vast majority of Christians, Druze, and even Sunni Muslims do not want to participate actively in the Arab-Israeli conflict, their suffering in future clashes in that quarrel should be limited. Anything that weakens the Lebanese government and society is against Israel’s interests.

Obviously, of course, this does not include direct strikes against Hizballah but there should be no such attacks against the Lebanese infrastructure, aside perhaps from roads being used as part of Hizballah’s military effort. To hold the Lebanese government responsible for Hizballah–when it would love to rein in that group but cannot do so–is sheer folly.

It is clear also that Hizballah is not highly responsive to rational calculations of the strategic balance or to the infliction of material damage. Certainly, destroying its military equipment and killing its troops can be most effective. But material damage inflicted even on its supporters is welcomed by Hizballah as a means of mobilizing them and even making them financially dependent on an organization well-funded by Damascus and Tehran.

If, therefore, Israel is going to force a state actor to pay the price in order to give it an incentive to rein in Hizballah the proper address is Syria.

There is another important factor here which suggests holding Syria, rather than Lebanon to account. International diplomacy and public opinion has become an important force in shaping regional issues. This situation was central to the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war when there were tremendous demands and heavy pressures for Israel to stop operations in and against Lebanon.

In the event of a Syrian-oriented response, however, such reaction and pressures would probably be much less. Unlike Lebanon, Syria would not be seen as an innocent victim able to muster sympathy. Attacks on Syrian government, military, and even strategic facilities would be less likely to involve civilian casualties. And while Israel has something political to lose by alienating Lebanese, there are no such considerations regarding Syria. Given the fact that peace with Syria is simply not a possibility–a fact that should be clear for anyone going beyond the most superficial level of solely English-language rhetoric from Damascus–there is nothing to lose on this front either.

To rebuild Israeli deterrence requires a proper degree of credible threat against those inciting, planning, financing, and equipping attacks on Israel. This should be directed against those forces which are both implacable enemies and which have to take into account material losses. If deterrence must turn into implementation, the guns should be pointed in the right direction. Let the Syrian rulers tremble where now they swagger.

Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book, The Truth about Syria was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in May 2007.

Albert Einstein once defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. In that regard it is worth noting the actions of some of Congress regarding the four letter word starting with I; no not Iraq, the other I, Iran.

One might think, after all the news about Administration lies and deception about what the U.S. said about Iraqi WMD that members of congress would be, shall we say, a bit cautious about accepting at face value what the executive branch now says about Iran’s intent to go all out for nuclear weapons. Indeed, you might think that but you would be wrong.

Despite the fact that even senior members of the military are increasingly antsy about the prospect of attacking Iran, as Seymour Hersh’s latest New Yorker article details, even the most superficial perusal of the record shows that the average congressman and senator still prefers to play to the crowd.

H. CON. RES. 341 condemned the Government of Iran “for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.â€Â 

H. R. 282, introduced April 27, 2006, holds the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and support a transition to democracy (can you say regime change�) in Iran.

These are not useful, especially when the United States is actually, finally, trying to diplomatically negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program.

That is why it is so heartening to see a few signs of sanity here and there. For example, on June 8 Congressmen Kirk and Andrews introduced H. Con. Res. 425 expressing the sense of Congress that the crisis regarding Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved primarily through diplomatic means.

On June 19 Sen. Reid introduced S. 3536 to ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran. One particular provision merits notice, as it reflects congressional experience with past executive branch interference with the intelligence community in respect to Iraq. Section C requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon intelligence.  Notably, the report must describe how significant misstatements of intelligence that may occur in public statements of senior public officials are identified, brought to the attention of any such officials, and corrected.  In light of what we know now about White House pressure on the CIA with respect to Iraq, prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, this might be thought of the anti-Dick Cheney clause. 

Even more direct was the resolution introduced back in April by Rep. Peter Defazio. Res. 391 expressed the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran with respect to its nuclear program without first obtaining authorization from Congress.

Given the administration’s tortured logic regarding their supposed right to unilaterally undertake military action it is downright refreshing to see a member of Congress with enough spine to actually stand up for the Constitution. DeFazio’s legislation noted:

Whereas the President further argues that previous unilateral actions by presidents of both political parties add credence to this interpretation of the Constitution;

Whereas in reality, nothing in the history of the `Commander-in-Chief’ clause suggests that the authors of the provision intended it to grant the executive branch the authority to engage United States forces in military action without any prior authorization from Congress, except to allow the President to repel sudden attacks and immediate threats;

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress–

(1) strongly believes initiating military action without congressional approval in response to Iran’s nuclear program does not fall within the President’s `Commander-in-Chief’ powers under the Constitution;

(2) rejects any suggestion that Public Law 107-40, the authorization of force resolution approved in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, explicitly or implicitly, extends to authorizing military action against Iran over its nuclear program;

(3) rejects any suggestion that Public Law 107-243, the authorization of force resolution approved by Congress to go to war with Iraq, explicitly or implicitly, extends to authorizing military action against Iran over its nuclear program; and

(4) strongly and unequivocally believes that seeking congressional authority prior to taking military action against Iran is not discretionary, but is a legal and constitutional requirement.

Most recently the Senate voted 99-0 to adopt an amendment by Joseph R. Biden, Jr. to the Defense authorization bill endorsing the president’s efforts to use diplomacy in resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. The Senate earlier rejected 45-54 an amendment by Sen. Rick Santorum setting conditions for continuing sanctions against foreign governments and companies investing in Iran’s energy sector and authorizing $100 million to promote democracy in Iran.

Maybe, this time around, Congress is actually heeding the lessons of the past. One can only hope.